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By Sandra Ward 
 
Arthur Murton joined the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in 1986 as a financial economist and 
rose through the ranks to become Director of the Division of Insurance and Research, a post he 
held from 1995 to 2013 and which he steered through the financial crisis of 2007-09. Murton 
participated in the important interagency discussions held on Columbus Day weekend in 2008 
that led to the establishment of breakthrough programs that proved critical in stabilizing 
financial markets. This “Lessons Learned” summary is based on an interview with Mr.  Murton 
about his crisis experience. 
Broaden the View: Regulators should assume more watchful and nuanced monitoring.  
Despite concerns about and analyses of subprime lending activities and the potential risks 
posed to the economy in the years leading up to the crisis, there was a lack of understanding 
among regulators of how intertwined financial institutions had become and how severe a 
problem was developing, notes Murton. He says, 
We didn’t appreciate the magnitude of the problems that we were going to have, and 
we didn’t really have a good window into some of the interconnectedness in the 
banking system and financial system. Things such as SIFIs [systemically important 
financial institutions] we weren’t really aware of and didn’t see how the risk was 
building up, not in the banks themselves, but in their affiliates and other holdings. 
Understanding current risks to the financial system requires vigilance by the regulatory 
community, says Murton. He stresses that it is important for regulators, like the FDIC, to keep 
abreast of developments like the linkages between banks and nonbanks in order to be 
prepared to address problems that may arise outside of the traditional banking system. He 
says, 
We need to do a better job before the problems arise. We need to be ready to exercise 
the authority we’ve been given. In the last crisis, we thought a lot of risk was outside 
the banking system and banks’ balance sheets, but it all came back to the banks’ 
balance sheets. So, we can’t be lulled into a false sense of security when problems 
arise outside the banking system.” 
Collaboration: The key to successful programs.  
Working in concert with other federal agencies, including Treasury and the Federal Reserve, 
to establish the debt guarantee programs aimed at stabilizing the financial system, says 
Murton, sped up the design of the programs and allowed for a structure that was financially 
sound. The collaboration among agencies was valuable in coping with issues that were new 
to all and necessary to implementing the programs and their ultimate success. 
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It was also important, he notes, to work together with those that would be issuing the 
guaranteed debt, in order to manage operational issues and smooth out snags in the early 
stages of the programs. He observes, 
What we learned was that the partners of this debt expected regular payments at 
regular times and wanted those payments to come at precisely the times they were 
supposed to, and there’s a specific term for it called “time and payment.” We had to 
be prepared to make the payments that the debtor expected at precisely the time they 
were due. That was different from what we did in normal bank failures.  
We had to work out operational issues as to how we would do this and come up with 
ways that we could be sure that we could make the payment if one of these banks that 
had issued this guaranteed debt defaulted. For example, with commercial paper, 
which is based on short-term debt, it could be an issue if, in the case of a default, the 
relevant parties would learn of it in the morning and we would need to be able to pay 
it by the end of the afternoon. We had to work with the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve and others to come up with a way that we could do that. Once we did that, 
the banks and the public got much more confident with the different programs. 
Global engagement: Building a stronger global financial system is necessary. 
Historically, the FDIC didn’t interact much with its overseas financial regulatory 
counterparts, and so while the Europeans were first movers in rolling out guarantee 
programs and coordinated their efforts, U.S. efforts lagged, unable to draw on the European 
models, Murton recounts. That dynamic changed as a result of the crisis. He notes, 
It was a time, before the financial crisis, that the FDIC didn’t have a lot of engagement 
with other financial regulatory authorities in the other jurisdictions, which is 
completely different today. We now have very strong relationships with other 
jurisdictions, particularly the UK and the Bank of England, and the European Union 
through the Single Resolution Board, and so forth.  
We have a lot of engagement with them so it would be a very different situation today 
if something like this were to happen. We have a lot more dialogue about these things. 
We’re in a better position to deal with future problems because we have this kind of 
engagement.  
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